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CASE COMMENT
SEPARATION OF POWERS: THE JUDICIARY'S LIMITED ROLE
IN REVIEWING THE PRESIDENT'S DETENTION OF
ENEMY COMBATANTS
Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 316 F.3d 450 (4th Cir. 2003)*
Carolyn M Zegeer**
United States allied forces' captured Petitioner in a zone of active
military combat in Afghanistan.2 The President, claiming he was acting
under a grant of authority3 by Congress, 4 invoked his war powers as
Commander in Chief5 and declared Petitioner an enemy combatant.6 As a
result, Petitioner, a U.S. citizen, was taken into custody and detained on

* Editor's Note: This Case Comment received the Huber C. Hurst Award for the
outstanding case comment of Spring 2004. Prior to publication, the U.S. Supreme Court granted
certiorari and reversed the holding of the instant court. See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 124 S. Ct. 2633
(2004).
** For my parents, John and Annie Zegeer and my brother, Reverend Mr. Eric David
Zegeer. I would also like to thank Ben Diamond for his love and support.
1. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld (Hamdi II), 316 F.3d 450, 459 (4th Cir. 2003), vacatedby 124 S.
Ct. 2633 (2004). During military operations in Afghanistan, the United States provided military
assistance to allied forces, including the Northern Alliance, a military coalition opposing the
governing Taliban regime. Id. at 459-60.
2. Id. at 459.
3. Authorization for Use of Military Force, Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115 Stat. 224 (2001).
Congress authorized the President "to use all necessary and appropriate force against those nations,
organizations, or persons he determines planned, authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist
attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001, or harbored such organizations or persons ......
Authorization for Use of Military Force § 2(a).
4. Hamdi III, 316 F.3d at 459. This Comment assumes that Congress's Authorization for
Use of Military Force is sufficient authorization for the President to detain enemy combatants. See
supra text accompanying note 3. Note, however, that the sufficiency of Congress's authorization
is a separate issue not addressed in this Comment, although relevant in the instant case. See Hamdi
III, 316 F.3d at 467-68.
5. The U.S. Constitution states, in relevant part: "The President shall be Commander in
Chief of the Army ... when called into the actual Service of the United States." U.S. CONST. art.
II, § 2, cl. 1.
6. See Hamdi111, 316 F.3d at 460-61, 463 n.3. Combatants acting as associates of a terrorist
organization or operating in connection with al Qaeda or the governing Taliban regime were
deemed enemy combatants by the government. Id. at 459-60.
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American soil7 without being charged with a crime and without access to
counsel.8 Petitioner filed a writ of habeas corpus, challenging the
lawfulness of his detention as an enemy combatant.9 The U.S. District
Court for the Eastern District of Virginia held that the government's
account" of Petitioner's capture" was insufficient to justify Petitioner's
detention. 2 The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reversed, and
7. See id. at 460. Once he was in U.S. custody, Petitioner was transferred to Guantanamo
Bay, Cuba, the holding place for noncitizen enemy combatants. Id. After the government verified
Petitioner was indeed a U.S. citizen, it transferred him to the Norfolk Naval Station Brig in
Virginia, where he has remained ever since. Id.
8. See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 243 F. Supp. 2d 527, 528 (E.D. Va. 2002), rev'd, 316 F.3d 450
(4th Cir. 2003). The district court noted that "[tihis case appears to be the first in American
jurisprudence where an American citizen has been held incommunicado and subjected to an
indefinite detention in the continental United States without charges, without any findings by a
military tribunal, and without access to a lawyer." Id.
9. Hamdi I1, 316 F.3d at 459.
10. Respondents submitted an affidavit from Michael Mobbs, the Special Advisor to the
Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, confirming that Petitioner was captured in Afghanistan
during a sanctioned military campaign and that the executive branch has classified him as an enemy
combatant. Hamdi, 243 F. Supp. 2d at 533-34.
11. Id. The Mobbs declaration also described the circumstances surrounding Petitioner's
capture but failed to address much else. Id. The district court noted:
The declaration fails to address the nature and authority of Mr. Mobbs to review
and make declarations on behalf of the Executive regarding Hamdi's
classification....
• . . [T]he declaration . . . states that Hamdi was "affiliated with a Taliban
military unit and received weapons training[,]" . . . [but it] makes no effort to
explain ... under what criteria this "affiliation" justified Hamdi's classification
[and]
... is silent as to what level of "affiliation".., is necessary to warrant enemy
combatant status.
Id. at 533-34.
12. Id. at 534. Upon review of the Mobbs affidavit, the district court found that the affidavit
"falls far short" ofjustifying Petitioner's detention. Id. at 533. It noted:
The Mobbs Declaration is little more than the government's "say-so" regarding
the validity of Hamdi's classification as an enemy combatant. If the Court were
to accept the Mobbs Declaration as sufficient justification for detaining Hamdi in
the present circumstances, then it would in effect be abdicating any semblance of
the most minimal level ofjudicial review. In effect, this Court would be acting as
little more than a rubber-stamp.

CASE COMMENT

HELD, that the evidence was constitutionally sufficient to detain Petitioner
as an enemy13combatant through a legitimate exercise of the President's
war powers.
The U.S. Supreme Court has previously recognized the President's
authority, as Commander in Chief, to detain enemies of the United States
captured during active military combat.' 4 However, this war power only
vests in the President 5 if Congress has declared war 6 and included the
power to detain enemy combatants in its declaration.' 7 The purpose of this
separation of powers is to "protect the liberty and security of the
governed."' 8 In defining the scope of the President's detention power, the
U.S. Supreme Court has struggled to balance its deference toward the
executive branch, which is best positioned to understand the exigencies of
war and the need for national security,"9 with the competing governmental
°
interest to protect the due process rights of the detained.2
In Ex parte Milligan,2 the U.S. Supreme Court established that the
President does not have the unilateral authority to detain and try U.S.
citizens during wartime.22 Milligan, a U.S. citizen, was captured during the
Civil War in a theatre of military operations and charged with attempting
to overthrow the federal government.23 The President authorized the
military to detain Milligan 24 and create a military commission, without a
25
grant of authority from Congress, to try him for those offenses. Milligan
filed a writ of habeas corpus claiming that the military commission did not

Id.at 535. The district court ordered the government to produce multiple documents concerning
Petitioner's status as an alleged enemy combatant, including the screening criteria used to
determine Petitioner's status. Id.at 533-35.
13. Hamdi III, 316 F.3d at 459.
14. Id. at 463 (citing Hamdi v. Rumsfeld (Hamdi II), 296 F.3d 278,281-82 (4th Cir. 2002)).
15. See supra text accompanying note 5.
16. The U.S. Constitution states: "The Congress shall have the Power To... provide for the
common Defence and general Welfare of the United States... To declare War... and make Rules
concerning Captures on Land and Water." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1, 11.
17. 18 U.S.C.A. § 4001(a) (West 2003). The federal statute mandates that "[n]o citizen shall
be imprisoned or otherwise detained by the United States except pursuant to an Act of Congress."
Id.
18. Hamdi I1,316 F.3d at 463 (quoting Metro. Wash. Airports Auth. v. Citizens for the
Abatement of Aircraft Noise, Inc., 501 U.S. 252, 272 (1991)).
19. See id.at 464.
20. See id.
21. 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2 (1866).
22. See id. at ll5.
at 140 (Chase, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
23. Id.at 107-08; id.
24. Id.at 115-16.
25. See id. at 108, 121.
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have the authority to try him because it was not authorized by Congress.26
Granting the petition, the U.S. Supreme Court held that congressional
authorization was necessary before the President could invoke his war
powers.27 Thus, Milligan eliminated any unilateral freedom the President
had to detain citizens on his own suspicion.28
Although the Court in Milligan restricted the President's power to
detain citizens absent congressional authority, 29 the Court did not define
the extent of the President's power when using such authorization.3"
Attempting to clarify the President's and Congress's bilateral relationship,
the Court emphasized that the President's duty is merely to execute the
laws of Congress.3 ' On the other hand, the Court recognized that the
President has discretion in determining whether a citizen should be
detained.3 2 The Court, however, did not limit the extent to which the
President may exercise that discretion. 3 Thus, despite the Milligan
holding, the President maintained the power to declare citizens to be
enemy combatants following congressional authorization.34
While Milligan limited the circumstances under which the President
may order detentions, Ex parte Quirin3 illustrated the need for judicial
review of enemy combatant designations.3 6 In Quirin,eight soldiers, acting

26. Milligan, 71 U.S. at 108.
27. See id. at 115. "[T]he President... is controlled by law, and has his appropriate sphere
of duty, which is to execute, not to make, the laws." Id. at 121.
28. Id. Petitioner argued persuasively that without this congressional limitation on the
President's war powers, the President may then "become [] absolute master of our liberties and our
lives... [we would be] subject to martial rule, administered by the President upon his own sense
of exigency, with nobody to control him, and with every magistrate and every authority in the land
subject to his will alone." Id. at 22 (citing Petitioner's argument).
29. Id. at 115; see id. at 139-40 (Chase, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
30. See id. at 139-40 (Chase, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). The Court noted
that, although the President is invested with the authority to command the armed forces and conduct
military campaigns during wartime, it is within the power of Congress to declare war, and as such,
provide "legislation essential to the prosecution ofwar." Id. at 139 (Chase, C.J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part).
31. Milligan, 71 U.S. at 121. The Court also extended Congress's power to make law
necessary for the execution of war to congressional authorization of military tribunals. Id. The
Court recognized that, "when the nation is involved in war.., it is within the power of Congress
to determine... [where] imminent public danger exists [that] justifies the authorization of military
tribunals for the trial of crimes." Id. at 140 (Chase, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
32. Id. at 118. The Court recognized this discretionary power by emphasizing that the basic
facts the President relied upon to detain Petitioners must be subject to judicial review. Id.
33. See id.
34. Seeid. at 115.
35. 317 U.S. 1 (1942).
36. See id. at 28.
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under instructions from the German Reich,37 secretly entered the United
States with the intent to destroy key components of the American war
industry during the Second World War.3" They were captured and the
President ordered that they be detained and tried by a military
4
commission. 9 The Nazi soldiers petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus "
claiming the President's order to try them before a military court was
unconstitutional.4" Affirming the Milligan holding, the Court emphasized
that the President could only act pursuant to preexisting congressional
authorization42 and that his actions were limited to ensuring that the laws
were faithfully executed.43 The Court reasoned that the rules Congress set
forth in the Articles of War were sufficient to serve as legislative
authorization.' Thus, the U.S. Supreme Court concluded that the President
had the authority to try the soldiers since he was acting pursuant to law
passed by Congress. 5
Although the Quirin Court found that the President had the requisite
congressional authorization to establish military tribunals,' it also
recognized that the President had discretion to determine enemy combatant
status. 7 The Court determined that it must review the criteria the President

37. Id. at 21.
38. Id. The Court described the Petitioners as "those who during time of war pass
surreptitiously from enemy territory into our own, discarding their uniforms upon entry, for the
commission of hostile acts involving destruction of life or property." Id. at 35.
39. Id. at 21-22.
40. Quirin, 317 U.S. at 19.
41. Id. at 24, 46-47.
42. See id. at 26. The Court suggests that the power to detain and try enemy combatants is
a constitutional authority vested in Congress. Id. at 26-27.
43. Id. at 28.
44. Id. The Court derived the President's power to detain and try enemy combatants from his
power to enforce congressional legislation pursuant to the Articles of War. Id.
45. Quirin, 317 U.S. at 48. Thus, the Court did not have to consider whether the President
had the power to detain and try enemy combatants under the Commander in Chief clause of the
Constitution. The Court stated that "[i]t is unnecessary for present purposes to determine to what
extent the President as Commander in Chief has constitutional power to create military
commissions without the support of Congressional legislation. For here Congress has authorized
trial of offenses against the law of war before such commissions." Id. at 29.
46. See supra text accompanying note 44.
47. See Quirin, 317 U.S. at 28. In order to determine whether the President's order was
justified, the Court found it necessary to examine the factual circumstances surrounding Petitioners'
capture. See id. at 36. The Court determined that Petitioners were unlawful combatants because
they were engaged in spying and sabotage against the United States. Id. at 35.
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used to declare the soldiers unlawful enemy combatants. 8 The Court
reaffirmed that the judiciary reserves the right to review congressional and
presidential actions governing the law of war.4 9 The Court held that
Petitioners were accurately deemed unlawful combatants." Therefore,
under the Articles of War they were not entitled to a trial in a civil
proceeding. 5'
In Padillav. Bush, 2 the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of
New York accepted the necessity for judicial review of the President's
detention power.5 3 Although the court utilized a "some evidence" standard
of review, 4 this standard reinforced the President's unilateral authority to
detain people with minimal evidence." In Padilla,Petitioner was found to
have extensive ties with enemy forces engaged in hostile activities against
the United States. 6 Based on these findings, the President designated
48. See id. at 29-31. The Court distinguished unlawful from lawful combatants by
emphasizing that unlawful combatants generally act secretly and without warning. Id. An unlawful
combatant, the Court added, is:
The spy who secretly and without uniform passes the military lines of a belligerent
in time of war, seeking to gather military information and communicate it to the
enemy, or an enemy combatant who without uniform comes secretly through the
lines for the purpose of waging war by destruction of life or property.
Id. at 31.
49. The Court emphasized that "[flrom the very beginning of its history this Court has
recognized and applied the law of war as including that part of the law of nations which prescribes,
for... the status, rights and duties... of enemy individuals." Id. at 27-28.
50. Id. at 35.
51. Id.
52. 233 F. Supp. 2d 564 (S.D.N.Y. 2002).
53. Id. at 608. Although the district court stated that the President need not be subject to
judicial review, it emphasized that its consideration hinges upon whether "there was some evidence
to support the President's finding" to designate Padilla an enemy combatant. Id. at 588. Despite this
assertion, the district court noted that the political branches "need not submit those judgments to
review by Article III courts ... they are subject to the perhaps less didactic but nonetheless
searching audit of the democratic process."). Id. at 607.
54. Id. at 608.
55. See id. This "some evidence" standard was suggested by the government in their motions
before the district court. Id. (citing Resp'ts Resp. to and Mot. to Dismiss Am. Pet. at 17).
56. Id. at 572-73. The President's Order addressed to the Secretary of Defense set forth that
Padilla
is "closely associated with al Qaeda," engaged in "hostile and war-like acts"
including "preparation for acts of international terrorism" directed at this country,
possesses information that would be helpful in preventing al Qaeda attacks, and
represents "a continuing, present and grave danger to the national security of the
United States."

2005]
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Padilla an enemy combatant 7 and detained him on American soil.58 In
filing a writ of habeas corpus, Padilla claimed that the President lacked the
authority to detain him under the circumstances.59 The government moved
to dismiss the petition.' The court denied the motion to dismiss, stating
that it would review whether the President had some61evidence to support
his finding that Petitioner was an enemy combatant.
The court in Padilla recognized Padilla's right to challenge the
62
President's authority to detain him on any set of facts whatsoever. At the
same time, the court demonstrated incredible judicial deference to
executive decision making on detainees' status by imposing a minimum
standard of review. 63 The court noted that the judiciary is best suited to
decide whether "facts have been established by competent evidence, or
whether those facts are sufficient to warrant a particular conclusion."'
Concluding that such extensive factual review was not within its judicial
authority,65 the court would only review whether there was a minimum
amount of evidence, or "some evidence," to support the President's
conclusions.' If Milligan and Quirin narrowed the scope of executive
detention power, Padilla no doubt expanded it by applying an illusory
standard of review toward the President's authority. 67 What remained
unresolved after Padilla, however, was whether courts would follow
Padilla and apply a lenient standard of review or whether future courts
would subject executive detention power to more meaningful scrutiny.

Id. at 572. The facts presented to the district court further alleged that Padilla approached Osama
Bin Laden and proposed stealing materials for, building, and detonating a dirty bomb within the
United States. Id.at 572-73. Padilla allegedly discussed this proposal and other terrorist acts against
the United States with al Qaeda officials. Id. at 573. Padilla was alleged to have extensive contacts
with senior al Qaeda members and operatives, to have acted under their direction and received
extensive training from them "in furtherance of terrorist activities," and to have "conduct[ed]
reconnaissance and/or conduct[ed] other attacks" in the United States on their behalf. Id.
57. Padilla,233 F. Supp. 2d at 572.
58. Id. at 571. Petitioner was taken into custody by the U.S. Department of Defense and
transferred to a South Carolina naval brig. Id. at 582.
59. Id. at 569.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 570.
62. Padilla,233 F. Supp. 2d at 599.
63. See id at 605-06. It is difficult to see how such a minimum standard of "some evidence"
could be sufficient for a meaningful or even effective review of the President's determinations.
64. Id. at 607-08.
65. See supra text accompanying note 53.
66. Padilla,233 F. Supp. 2d at 608.
67. See supra text accompanying notes 53-55, 63.
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In the instant case, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit did
not review the sufficiency of the evidence the President used to deem
Petitioner an enemy combatant.68 Instead, the instant court concluded that
the available facts 69 were sufficient to confirm Petitioner's detention
because further factual inquiry would be "inappropriate."7 Therefore, the
instant court held that the President's findings were justified because,
absent further factual inquiry, the decision was a legitimate exercise of the
7
President's war powers. 1
Unlike the courts in Quirin and Padilla, the instant court refused to
consider additional evidence in analyzing the President's determination.72
The instant court justified this decision on three grounds. First, the instant
court held that further factual inquiry of Petitioner's capture is not
logistically sensible and would require an "excavation of facts buried
under the rubble of war. ' 73 Imposing this requirement would distract
American forces with the complexities of litigation and divert their
attention away from winning the war. 71 Second, requesting specific facts 75
to conduct a review would demand clarity from a battle which is often
imprecise and unclear. 76 Finally, to require detailed evidence, the instant

68. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld (Hamdi 11I), 316 F.3d 450, 474 (4th Cir. 2003). The instant court
maintained that it was not necessary for them to consider whether the "some evidence" standard
was an acceptable standard. Id. However, the instant court noted that the "some evidence" standard
has been applied before in less constitutionally sensitive cases. Id. at 473-74 (citing INS v. St. Cyr,
533 U.S. 289, 306 (2001) ("describing historical practice under which, so long as 'there was some
evidence to support' a deportation order, habeas courts would not 'review factual determinations
made by the Executive.')).
69. Id. at 459. The instant court referred specifically to the fact that Petitioner was captured
in a zone of active combat in a foreign theatre of conflict. Id. at 473.
70. Id. at 474. Although the instant court refused to apply the "some evidence" standard, this
undisputed minimal evidence significantly contributed to the instant court's holding. Id.
71. Id. at 473. The instant court asserted that exercising such discretion is a legitimate
exercise of the President's war powers under Article II, Section 2 of the U.S. Constitution. See
supra text accompanying note 5.
72. See Hamdi III, 316 F.3d at 471.
73. See id. The instant court also expressed concern that attempting to collect additional facts
during wartime would place a strain on multilateral efforts. Id. For example, requesting the
Northern Alliance to give statements regarding the specifics surrounding Petitioner's capture could
create such a strain. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 473 (referring, for example, to the inquiry of whether or not Petitioner ever fired
his weapon).
76. Id. The instant court went on to explain that chaos and mistakes happen during warfare
and that was never enough reason in the past to require judicial review. Id.
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court suggested, goes far beyond its scope of review,77 and is unnecessary
for meaningful judicial review.78 Since the instant court found that
obtaining additional facts was inappropriate, its judicial review of
Petitioner's status was substantially limited.79
The instant court, however, emphasized the importance of reviewing
the detention ofU.S. citizens.8° Acknowledging that Milliganindicates that
detention must be subject to review, 8 the instant court added that this
includes reviewing "the military's determination that [Petitioner was] an
'enemy combatant' subject to detention."" However, the instant court did
not exercise this fundamental check on executive power.83 While
recognizing they had a responsibility established in precedent to review the
President's decision, the instant court did not consider it appropriate to
conduct its review with much scrutiny. Instead, the instant court explained
that limitations on judicial activities should be inferred.84 In order to
protect U.S. security interests, the instant court avoided intruding in
military affairs.8 5 Thus, the instant case's heightened deference to
77. Hamdi III, 316 F.3d at 473. Considering further factual exploration of the President's
finding on Petitioner's status would require the instant court to "step so far out of [its] role.., that
[it] would abandon the distinctive deference that animates this area of the law." Id. The instant
court expressed its concern that this "would bring an Article III court into conflict with the
warmaking powers of Article I and II." Id.at 470. But cf id.at 464 ("As early as 1789, Congress
reaffirmed the courts' common law authority to review detentions of federal prisoners, giving its
explicit blessing to the judiciary's power to 'grant writs of habeas corpus for the purpose of an
inquiry into the cause of commitment' for federal detainees.") (quoting Act of Sept. 24, 1789, ch.
20, § 14, 1 Stat. 81-82).
78. Id. at 473. "Asking the executive to provide more detailed factual assertions would be
to wade further into the conduct of war than we consider appropriate and is unnecessary to a
meaningful judicial review of this question." Id.
79. Id.at 461. The instant court sanctioned a "limited and deferential inquiry into Hamdi's
status, noting 'that if Hamdi is indeed an 'enemy combatant' who was captured during hostilities
in Afghanistan, the government's present detention of him is a lawful one."' Id (quoting Hamdi
v. Rumsfeld (HamdiI), 296 F.3d 278, 283 (4th Cir. 2002) (citing ExparteQuirin, 317 U.S. 1,31,
37 (1942))).
80. Id. at 464. "Our forbears recognized that the power to detain could easily become
destructive 'if exerted without check or control' by an unrestrained executive free to 'imprison,
dispatch, or exile any man that was obnoxious to the government, by an instant declaration that
such is their will and pleasure."' Id. at 464 (quoting 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES
*344).
81. Id.
82. Hamdi II, 316 F.3d at471.
83. Id.at 463. The instant court instead described its approach as one of "healthy deference"
to the executive's determinations. Id. (citing Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57, 66 (1981)).
84. Id.at 462. Surprisingly, the instant court supported this claim by citing Quirin.Id.Contra
supra text accompanying notes 48-50.
85. Hamd III, 316 F. 3d at 473.
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executive decisions and lenient judicial review renewed the President's
86
unilateral freedom to detain people on limited evidence.
By deferring to the President's unilateral authority, the instant court
failed to serve its most fundamental constitutional purpose, to check
executive action. 7 The motivation behind this deferential posture is clear:
to protect the government's intelligence and national security interests.8 8
Although it is important to defer to the political branches during times of
conflict; doing so to the detriment of a citizen's liberty interests distorts its
value. 9 In fact, it is precisely when our most sacrosanct legal rights are
being infringed upon that the judiciary must remain active and ensure that
it provides effective judicial review.9"
The instant court relied on Quirin to support the proposition that the
judiciary conducts limited activities during wartime.9 ' However, Quirin
did not endorse unilateral executive authority to detain and try enemy
combatants.92 In fact, the Quirin Court did more than emphasize that the
President's detention powers were contingent on legislative authority.93
More importantly, the Court reviewed the exercise of the President's
powers by examining whom he designated an enemy combatant. 94
Furthermore, Quirinrelied on the fundamental principle first set forth
in Milligan that the detention of U.S. citizens is subject to judicial
review.95 Following Milliganand Quirin,the courts clearly recognized that
the President's power to detain American citizens is subject to
constitutional limitations and review by the judiciary. 96 However, the
superficial review of the instant court in Petitioner's case is tantamount to
no review at all.97 By rehashing the importance of judicial review on the
one hand,98 and then refusing to conduct a substantive review on the

86. See supratext accompanying notes 29, 80.
87. But see HamdiI1,316 F.3d at 463.
88. Id.
89. Id.; see also supra text accompanying note 7.
90. See Hamdi III, 316 F.3d at 463-64.
91. Id. at 462; but cf. id. at 463 (emphasizing the need for judicial review by stating that
courts have historically recognized and applied the law relating to the status and rights ofAmerican
citizens detained by their own government).
92. See Exparte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 26 (1942).
93. Id.
94. See supra text accompanying note 48.
95. Quirin, 317 U.S. at 25.
96. See supra text accompanying notes 5, 16-17, 31, 43, 48-50.
97. See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld (Hamdi I), 316 F.3d 450, 459 (4th Cir. 2003).
98. See supratext accompanying note 80.
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other,9 9 the instant court implies that judicial review of the executive's
detention power serves only a limited purpose.
The instant court even refused to consider the more lenient "some
evidence" standard applied in Padilla.° Reasoning that it was
unnecessary to apply this standard, the instant court relied on other
considerations to support the President's detention power.' 1 However, the
holding in the instant case still considered the minimal facts available"0 2
and determined that the facts justified the detention of Petitioner.' 3
Essentially, the instant court indirectly applied the Padillastandard since
it required a review of only some evidence, rather than no evidence. The
instant court noted that the government sought a "some evidence" standard
of review in the instant case.'" The government supported its argument by
citing less constitutionally sensitive cases where the standard had been
applied. 5 However, if the courts are protecting a more constitutionally
sensitive right, such as Petitioner's liberty, removing that right should
require a heightened degree of scrutiny.'" If Padillalost sight of the depth
of review necessary to protect liberty interests established in Milligan, 7
the instant court's refusal to apply any standard ignored the U.S.
Constitution's principle of balancing powers.' 8
Indeed, at the center of the instant court's decision is the concern that
requiring additional evidence from the executive branch would be
inappropriate.0 9 In its reasoning,"0 the instant court suggested that
demanding additional facts justifying Petitioner's capture would require
that the captors be clear of that evidence."' The instant court found this
expectation unreasonable. The instant court noted that mistakes have
always been an inevitable part of warfare but that fact alone has never
99. See supra text accompanying notes 83-84.
100. HamdilII, 316 F.3d at 474; see also Padilla v. Bush, 233 F. Supp. 2d 564,608 (S.D.N.Y.
2002).
101. Hamdi 1, 316 F.3d at 474.
102. See supra text accompanying note 69.
103. Hamdi II, 316 F.3d at 473.
104. Id. at 473-74.
105. See supra text accompanying note 68.
106. See Hamdi I11,316 F.3d at 473-74.
107. See supra text accompanying note 28.
108. Butcf. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 243 F. Supp. 2d 527, 534 (E.D. Va. 2002), rev'd, 316 F.3d
450 (4th Cir. 2003) (stating that the instant court is unable to determine whether the government
has "paid adequate consideration" to Petitioner's due process rights without access to the
"screening criteria actually used by the government in its classification decision").
109. HamdiI1, 316 F.3d at 474.
110. See supra text accompanying notes 73-78.
111. HamdiII,316 F.3d at 473.
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been enough to justify judicial review." 2 However, the precedent cases to
which the instant court refers, such as Milligan and Quirin, apply a more
13
meaningful review than the instant court."
The instant court cited as an example the question of whether Petitioner
actually fired his weapon in an attempt to illustrate that this is the kind of
fact that would likely be unclear to his captors." 4 While the complexities
and chaos of war are difficult to appreciate, if facts critical to determining
Petitioner's status as an enemy combatant are unclear, then authorizing his
detention would be acting on mere suspicion. This is precisely the
determination our forbears sought to avoid." 5
Instead, the instant court could have completely followed the Quirin
approach." 6 Although the instant court concluded that the President was
acting on congressional authority, l l7 it could have reviewed the President's
exercise of that authority by inquiring into the facts relevant to Petitioner's
detention."' Alternatively, the instant court could have checked what has
been a unilateral Presidential determination by limiting the extent to which
the President may exercise his discretion. An appropriate limit might be
to create a heightened standard of evidentiary review that accurately
reflects the liberty interests at stake." 9 Rather, the instant court contradicts
clear precedent by limiting the extent of the judiciary's review of
presidential detentions. This elevated judicial deference will ultimately
have a profound impact on how power is apportioned between the
executive and judicial branches during wartime.

112. See supra text accompanying note 76.
113. See Hamdi I1, 316 F.3d at 464, 475 (citing ExparteMilligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2, 120
(1866) and Exparte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 21 (1942)).
114. Id. at473.
115. See supra text accompanying note 28.
116. See Quirin, 317 U.S. at 28, 48.
117. See supratext accompanying notes 3-4.
118. Quirin, 317 U.S. at31 n.10.
119. See supratext accompanying note 106.

